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Elite and Mass Confidence in New Democracies – 
Towards Congruence? The Baltic States 1992-2007 
Anton Steen  
Abstract: »Eliten- und Bevölkerungsvertrauen in neuen Demokratien – auf 
dem Weg zur Konvergenz? Die baltischen Staaten 1992-2007«. Confidence in 
political and social institutions is of basic importance for democratic rule. The 
topic here is the patterns of elite and mass confidence in parliament, police, 
private business, and the church, in three Baltic States following the collapse of 
communism. The main finding is that elite’s confidence in new institutions is 
considerably more affirmative than among the mass public, indicating their 
leading role in the consolidation process. I argue that this finding is more in 
line with the theory of democratic elitism than liberal democratic theory and 
underscore the vital role of elites in the process of democratic consolidation. 
However, gaps and trends over time vary between the countries, which also 
accentuate the importance of national contexts as explanations. 
Keywords: elite, mass confidence, democracy, democratic consolidation, Bal-
tic States. 
Introduction 
Democratic regimes require mass public as well as elite support in order to 
sustain their legitimacy, preserve stability and perform vital functions. A cer-
tain level of support for political and social institutions is important in estab-
lished democracies, and even more important in countries where authoritarian 
rule and state economic planning recently have been replaced by democracy 
and a free market economy, as in the three Baltic States following the demise 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, there are debates as to what is the re-
quired level of public support, and what is the necessary level of congruence 
between elite- and mass support, as well as what are the implications of varia-
tion in support and congruence for legitimate democratic rule. An occasional 
gap in confidence may be difficult to interpret, and such a gap does not usually 
undermine political stability. More consequential and important for democratic 
stability and quality of democracy, especially in new democracies, are long-
term trends in elite and mass views of vital institutions. A central question 
therefore, is how congruent are the elite and mass assessments in Estonia, Lat-
via and Lithuania, the three Baltic States under scrutiny in this paper? 
                                                             
  Address all communications to: Anton Steen, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 
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Here I will compare the elite and mass views concerning the two focal new 
institutions, parliament and the market economy, and how these views corre-
spond to confidence in two old institutions continuing from the past, the police 
and the church. The democratic challenge is that after change of regime, in the 
short run, elected politicians and the market system often cannot live up to 
people’s expectations. Mass confidence will then erode, making the stability of 
new institutions particularly contingent on the elite’s confidence in them. As to 
old institutions continuing from the past, common experiences may create a 
more congruent pattern of confidence among mass and elite. 
It is widely acknowledged that elites play a major role in change of authori-
tarian regimes and in democratic consolidation, but we know much less about 
the dynamics of elite and mass attitudes to basic institutions in this process. 
Liberal democratic theory argues that the elite’s beliefs and actions stem from 
the views of mass publics, while democratic elitism suggests that elites actively 
shape democratic institutions, and that they pave the way in granting legitimacy 
to new institutions and new social and political order. Comparing patterns of 
elite-mass confidence in central institutions over time may give us some an-
swers as to which of the competing theoretical claims is more accurate. 
Democratic Theory and the Elite-Mass Connection 
Liberal democratic theory suggests that congruence between elite and mass 
confidence is a prerequisite of sustainable democracy. The theory argues that 
elected elites act (and should act) as delegates expressing the opinions the 
voters want them to hold. In this vein, Pitkin’s theory of political representation 
(1967) claims that elite-mass congruence has to be regarded as a requirement 
for democratic rule, while gaps between elites and the mass public indicate a 
lack of democratic consolidation. Consequently, one could expect that elite-
mass orientations are interdependent and that confidence in institutions will 
reflect a congruent pattern. 
Alternatively, democratic elitist theory claims that representatives are 
autonomous (and should be independent); they should be considered as author-
ized agents that follow their own convictions as to what is in the best interest of 
the people, being held accountable through election cycles. This is even more 
true when elites who are not directly accountable to the public vote are in-
cluded. Elite orientations are independent of the mass public; elites shape the 
views of the masses, and “institutions that constitute liberal democracy is pri-
marily an elite creation to which mass publics gradually and slowly accede” 
(Higley and Burton 2006, 3). If democratic consolidation is a process where 
liberal elites are established, and where the mass public slowly complies with 
elites’ liberal orientations – as democratic elitists argue – one would expect a 
considerable differences of views between elites and the mass public in the 
early stages, and a gradual convergence of views over time. 
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Most observers agree that consolidation of democratic institutions depends 
on a general agreement among the public and their leaders that the new institu-
tions are a better option than the institutions of the former regime. However, as 
Petersson (2010) argues, elite-mass congruence of views is not the only basis 
of democratic legitimacy. In addition, I argue that the condition of elite-mass 
congruence in the Baltic States applies not only to core political institutions, 
such as parliament and free elections: important services are also performed by 
the state bureaucracy and institutions maintaining public order, such as police, 
the latter often surviving from the former regime. Further, the new political 
regime was closely connected to a change of economic regime, whereby pri-
vate business companies replaced a state regulated economy almost over-night. 
This is an important part of the overall transformation which had substantial 
impact on people’s daily lives. And one has to remember that the church has 
survived oppression and takes on a new and active social and political role in 
shaping a new regime. Indeed, the church represents an interesting contrasting 
institution when comparing elite and mass attitudes in times of regime consoli-
dation; its special symbolic function is different from that of the parliament, 
from private business companies, and from the police. 
If democracy is to be stable and representative, a consensually united elite 
must be formed and founded on an underlying consensus on most norms of 
political behaviour and “the worth of existing political institutions” (Higley and 
Burton 2006, 15). The advocates of democratic elitism argue that this thesis is 
applicable to all regime changes from authoritarian to stable democratic (Hig-
ley and Burton 2006, 19; Higley 2007, 250). However, the changes following 
the collapse of communism illustrate various elite patterns and diverse trajecto-
ries of elite change, and it is only in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic 
that a consensually unified elite came into power in the early stages following 
regime change (Higley, Pakulski and Wesołowski 1998, 7). This means that the 
elites evolving in these societies shared basic beliefs and values about funda-
mental institutions and procedures for political competition. The democracies 
that emerged were constructions of consensual – or at least consensus-reaching, 
elites. The same may be said about the new Baltic elites after 1991(Steen 
1997). 
Nevertheless, in the ensuing process of consolidating democracy mass sup-
port for basic institutions is essential. With little positive engagement for its 
basic institutions among ordinary people, democracy may wither away. As 
Linz and Stepan argue, a democratic regime “is consolidated when a strong 
majority of the public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and 
institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society 
such as theirs …” (1996, 6). Therefore, in order to understand the consolidation 
of new democracies, it is necessary to investigate the complex and dynamic 
relationship between the opinions of elites and non-elites. Moreover, in the 
case of the Baltic States in question, one has to keep in mind that the downfall 
 130 
of communism implied not only political changes but also the introduction of a 
market economy, the re-legitimation of old institutions, such as the police, and 
the continuity of an embedded religious culture. In other words, the working 
representative bodies and functioning institutions are vital to a stable society, 
but so are some non-state institutions, such as private business and the church. 
Consolidation of New Democracies 
Consolidation of democracy requires the support of elite and masses for the 
new political order. In this vein, Diamond (1999, 65) defines democratic con-
solidation as “the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation” across 
class, ethnic and other boundaries. A new normative commitment to democ-
ratic procedures is internalised so that the actor “instinctively conforms to 
written (and unwritten) rules of the game even when they conflict and compete 
intensively”. In other words, democracy is internalised only when norms be-
come routine in the political culture. In consolidation, however, it seems that 
elite views matter more than the mass attitudes because, as Dahl (1971), Put-
nam (1973) and Diamond (1999) observe, elites have a propensity for a coher-
ent system of beliefs, and these beliefs tend to guide their actions. Neverthe-
less, elites are not – as democratic elitist theory would argue – completely 
independent of the mass public, but rather adjusting to public opinion when 
necessary. For example, as Przeworski argues, social hardships following tran-
sition to democracy can lead to the erosion of mass confidence in politicians. 
Perhaps for this reason elites are usually pragmatic and will “vacillate between 
the technocratic political style inherent in market-oriented reforms and the 
participatory style required to maintain consensus” (1991, 189). 
Liberal democracy takes roots where various elite groups share core liberal 
values and agree on “the rules of the game”. Pluralist elite competition, in 
combination with an “underlying consensus about most norms of political 
behaviour and the worth of existing political institutions” (Higley and Burton 
2006, 14), constitute what Higley and Burton describe as a “consensually uni-
fied elite”. The elite political culture is based on the common acceptance of 
political rules of engagement, especially the rules of open and fair electoral 
competition. The embedding, deepening and improvement of democracy im-
plies establishing procedures for the peaceful resolution of inevitable conflicts, 
thus enhancing trust and mutual security among political actors (Dahl 1971; 
Diamond 1999). In a stable democratic regime the contest for power among 
different elite factions rests on popular support, which political elites need 
when competing for votes at elections (Schumpeter 1942/1996). In addition, 
Dahl insists that in a consolidated democracy a high level of confidence in 
institutions is also necessary between elections. 
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Confidence in Institutions 
According to Mishler and Rose (1999), legitimacy is established differently in 
new and old democracies. New democracies are supported mainly for what 
they do, while established democracies are valued also for what they are, be-
cause of long-term political socialisation. Economic growth and reasonable 
distribution of resources may be crucial, but there is no immediate relationship 
between economic misery and political instability. To be politically consequen-
tial, an economic and social crisis has to be converted into a political crisis by 
the political leaders of a country. 
Most investigations into institutional confidence in Western democracies 
have focused on mass attitudes and have generally concluded that confidence 
in political institutions is relatively low in many Western countries (Listhaug 
and Wiberg 1992). Indeed, the tendency over time has been towards erosion of 
public support (Pharr and Putnam 2000), though Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) 
have painted a less pessimistic picture, claiming that there was no evidence in 
this regard during the 1980’s. Miller (1993), however, had similar findings 
regarding low levels of trust in political institutions for Russia, Ukraine and 
Lithuania. With reference to post-Communist regimes, another survey of trust 
during the early transformation period in 15 different institutions in Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Belarus 
and Ukraine, found very little trust for any civil or political institution. “Scepti-
cism dominates popular evaluations of post-Communist institutions; on aver-
age, 53% evaluate an institution sceptically, as against 31 per cent showing 
distrust and 16 per cent trust” (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998, 155). 
As already noted, democratic governments require mass, as well as elite 
support. But what are the roots of this support and what is its lasting effect on 
the legitimacy of democracy? Are these roots to be found in support for institu-
tions, in support for leaders, or in satisfactory outcomes? In Steen (1996) I 
argue that in a leader-oriented political culture lack of support for institutions 
as such and their negative performance may be compensated for by beliefs in 
the leaders of these institutions. Easton (1975) and Gabriel (1992) assert that 
the most basic kind of legitimacy comes from support for institutions as such, 
irrespective of policy outcomes and popularity of leaders. According to Offe 
(1997), confidence in democratic institutions should be “diffuse” because all 
basic institutions are valued for their own sake. Confidence in institutions 
means that people have trust in basic processes that by their very nature sustain 
some vital social functions, or at least have the potential to do so. An alterna-
tive explanation points to “specific support”. This suggests that elites and the 
mass public are rational and act in response to how institutions contribute to 
their well-being, and to the opportunities they provide. One would expect, 
therefore, that the outcomes of institutional activities, as well as the popularity 
of leaders, jointly determine patterns of confidence. According to Barry (1970), 
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however, it is democratic institutions’ policy performance over a period of time 
that gives legitimacy to the political system. Therefore, as Smith (1972, 19) 
asserts, “value-related explanations take on a subordinate role” for legitimacy 
and support. 
However, performance and symbolic support are normally inter-related. If 
trust arises from the ability of institutions to produce positive policy outcomes, 
confidence will depend upon how these outcomes meet the expectations of the 
elite and the masses. Low confidence will stem not from doubt in institutions as 
such, but from poor performance feeding back to public perceptions of the 
institutions. “Specific” support is instrumental and directly related to how 
performance meets short-term expectations and implies a substantial de-
stabilising potential in times of economic crisis. Economic recession, poor 
quality of public services and corruption may reduce belief in institutions, but 
they will not necessarily lead to a widespread desire for change. A real crisis 
for democracy occurs only when the elite proposes to replace one institution 
with another. 
Methodology and Data 
The data on elite attitudes were collected in 1993-1995, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 
2006-2007. Between 280 and 315 high-level officials in each country were 
interviewed using standard questionnaires.1 The respondents comprise a com-
parable sample of the national elite, including parliamentary deputies, leading 
officials from the ministries, directors of major private business companies and 
state enterprises, and leaders of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 
judiciary, cultural institutions and local government. About 70 per cent of all 
parliament deputies were selected according to party strength in the national 
assemblies. For the other groups the criterion for selection was high level insti-
tutional positions. The interviews were carried out after each national election 
during the period, thus reflecting changes in election results. The samples are 
deemed representative of the national elite in each country during the survey 
period.2 
The following question was asked about various institutions, including par-
liament, the police, business companies, and the church: “Please tell me how 
                                                             
1  For details about the number of respondents interviewed for the elite surveys, see Appen-
dix. 
2  Saar Poll was responsible for carrying out and coding the interviews in Estonia. The first 
round of interviews in Latvia was carried out in cooperation with the Department of Politi-
cal Science, University of Latvia, later rounds by Baltic Data House. In Lithuania, the mar-
ket research company Baltic Surveys was responsible for conducting the survey. In total, 
the face to face interviews lasted approximately one hour, including a series of other ques-
tions. 
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much confidence you have in each of the institutions listed: a great deal, quite a 
lot, not very much or not at all?” 
A similar question was asked in several representative population surveys 
for the same period.3 The question wording was the following: “I would like to 
ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For 
each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend 
not to trust it”.4 
Patterns of Confidence 
I start by investigating the development of elite and mass support for two insti-
tutions inherently associated with regime change (parliament and private busi-
ness), and two institutions that are continuing from the past (the police from the 
previous regime, and the church even from the pre-Soviet period). Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania struggled for independence during the late 1980s, when 
nationalist elites mobilized a wave of widespread public protests, and formally 
changed from authoritarian to democratic rule after the Soviet collapse in 19915 
(Misiunas and Taagepera 1993; Lieven 1993; Gerner and Hedlund 1993; Smith 
1994; Nørgaard 1996; Clemens 2001). At the same time, state economic plan-
ning was replaced by market economy, and freedom of religion replaced state-
imposed atheism. One may assume that the elite’s and the people’s experiences 
from the national struggle for independence is an important symbolic context 
that over the following years have influenced their confidence in the four insti-
tutions investigated here. The results may be considered as indicating how 
various types of institutions meet the diffuse and material expectations of the 
                                                             
3  The representative population surveys in 1992 and 1997 included more than 1,000 respon-
dents in each of the three countries. These surveys were conducted by the author, financed 
by the Norwegian Research Council, and carried out by the following survey agencies: 
Emor (Estonia), Latvian Social Research Centre (Latvia) and Lithuanian Social Research 
Centre (Lithuania). The mass data from 1999 is from the European Value Survey, and this 
survey has the same wording of the question as in the elite-study. Data for the mass atti-
tudes in 2004, 2005 and 2007 are retrieved from the Eurobarometer. The population data 
for the period from 1999-2007 has kindly been provided by the Norwegian Social Science 
Data Services (NSD). 
The years in the figures refer to the year in which the elite surveys were begun, even though 
the field work for some of the surveys had to be carried over into the next year. And spo-
radically the elite surveys and the mass polls did not correspond in time. 
4  One should keep in mind that this question is somewhat different from the question used in 
the elite survey. Another difference is for the category business-institution. In the elite sur-
vey and mass survey in 1992 the term “major business companies” was used while in 1997 
the term is “private business companies”. In the European Value Survey and the Euro-
barometer survey the term “major business companies” was used. 
5  There exists a large literature on the Baltic States’ roads to independence in 1991 and the 
following consolidation period. Here I mention only some central contributions. 
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elites and the mass public in these states – with obvious consequences for de-
mocratic consolidation and sustainability. 
This study is, to the best of my knowledge, the first that compares levels of 
confidence and elite-mass convergence longitudinally. Previous research on 
elite-mass orientations suffers from lack of diachronic data – different countries 
being compared at only one point in time. When national contexts are very 
different, it opens the way for diverse explanations, so that conclusions for one 
country cannot be easily drawn for another. To try to overcome this problem, I 
compare three small neighbouring countries that are quite similar in size and 
basic national historical, cultural, structural and political contexts. One may 
argue that the Baltic States are close to a “laboratory” for social research and 
lend themselves to a “most similar systems” research design looking for coun-
try variation and holding context variables as constants. This makes it possible 
to identify specific explanatory variables that may account for national differ-
ences in patterns of confidence. Using longitudinal data also enables conclu-
sions to be drawn about actual similarities and differences in patterns of confi-
dence in various institutions between elites and masses, as well as meaning that 
one can dig more deeply into the dynamic aspect of democratic legitimation. 
However, the main focus here is not on explaining specific differences between 
the three countries but rather on how theories of liberal democracy and democ-
ratic elitism may explain why we find that elites invest more confidence in new 
institutions than the mass public. 
First, confidence in the four institutions is compared for each country. Then, 
the patterns found for each institution are contrasted between the countries. 
This is done by investigating three research questions: 
1) How much confidence is there among elites and the mass publics? 
2) How high is the level of elite-mass congruence? 
3) What is the trend over time both with respect to 1. and 2.? 
As mentioned earlier, liberal democratic theory and democratic elitism predict 
different patterns of confidence among elites and non-elites, which can be 
tested empirically. 
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The Results 
The figures below show the patterns of confidence in the four institutions and 
are compared for the period 1992-2007. 
Estonia 
Figure 1a: Confidence in Parliament 
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Figure 1b: Confidence in the Business Companies 
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Confidence in parliament (Figure 1a) follows a pattern of convergence. It is 
evident that people’s confidence in parliament have undergone positive devel-
opment, while elite’s confidence, after being on a very high level for many 
years, plateau and then slightly decline. This pattern indicates that the elite are 
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a defence to democracy during the consolidation period and that gradually the 
mass public is adopting the elite views. 
Business companies (Figure 1b) enjoy a high and stable level of confidence 
among the elites over the entire period – similar to trust in parliament. The 
mass public was initially quite negative in their attitudes to private business, 
but one sees a rapid change in these attitudes. However, the masses’ level of 
confidence in private business remained on a markedly lower level compared 
to that of the elites during the entire period covered by our research. 
Figure 1c: Confidence in the Police 
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Figure 1d: Confidence in the Church 
0
25
50
75
100
1992-1994 1997 1999-2000 2003-2004 2005-2007
Elite
Mass
 
 
Confidence in the police (Figure 1c) exhibits a different pattern. Both elite and 
masses are distrustful of the police during the 1990s, but from 2000 onwards 
there is a parallel sharp increase in confidence. Indeed, it is striking how con-
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gruent the level and developments are for these two groups over the entire 
period. 
As can be seen, confidence in the church (Figure 1d) was high among both 
groups in the early 1990s, but took a downward turn over time, although not 
dramatically. At the end of the period, confidence is still high, especially 
among the elites. 
Latvia 
Figure 2a: Confidence in the Parliament 
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Figure 2b: Confidence in Business Companies 
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Initially, the elite and mass confidence in parliament (Figure 2a) was both at 
the same low level. However, while the masses continue to be sceptical 
throughout the whole period, elites’ confidence in parliament clearly increases 
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over time. The low level of confidence of the people, and the widening elite-
mass gap, are surprising and puzzling. 
Confidence in the business companies (Figure 2b) among elites started on a 
low level (about 30 per cent) but had risen to over than 70 per cent by the end 
of the period. The general public was also very critical in the beginning with 
little more than 20 per cent expressing confidence in the new economic system. 
This lasted until the mid 1990s, and by the late 1990s we see a substantial 
change of attitude so that, by the end of the survey period, about 50 per cent of 
the masses expressed confidence in business companies. Nevertheless, the 
elite-mass gap is considerable after 1997. 
Figure 2c: Confidence in the Police 
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Figure 2d: Confidence in the Church 
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At the beginning of the survey period, confidence in the police (Figure 2c) was 
very low for both elites and the mass public. Over time, however, attitudes of 
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the two groups rise somewhat. Elite-mass congruence is rather high across the 
entire period. 
Confidence in the church (Figure 2d) has an inverted U-shape during the pe-
riod. It exhibits a fairly similar and parallel pattern among the elite and the 
masses until 1997. Starting on a relatively high level, with 54-64 per cent ex-
pressing confidence just after change of regime the support is increasing until 
the end of the 1990s and then declines in both groups. In particular among the 
masses the confidence drops significantly. 
Lithuania 
Figure 3a: Confidence in the Parliament 
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Reports of level of confidence in parliament (Figure 3a) show parallel down-
ward trends in the elites and the masses. In the early period, the elites’ confi-
dence was 60 per cent, but by the end of the survey period this has declined to 
less than 50 per cent. The level of confidence shown by the masses is much 
lower. It starts at around 30 per cent, but then declines to less than 20 per cent 
by 2007. From the viewpoint of democratic consolidation, the parallel down-
ward trend among both elites and masses may be cause for concern and even 
raise doubt about the basic legitimacy of the parliament. However, elite confi-
dence is still on a considerable higher level than mass confidence. 
As can be seen, business companies (Figure 3b) initially experienced the 
same low level of confidence (between 20 per cent and 30 per cent) among 
both the elites and masses. During the period of economic transformations, 
however, the gap enlarged noticeably with elites’ confidence increasing to 
more than 80 per cent by the end of the period, while that of the masses re-
mained low. 
Figure 3c: Confidence in the Police 
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Looking at trends in level of confidence in the police (Figure 3c), we see a 
rather congruent pattern among elites and masses. Both groups express more 
trust in the later period, with the elites on a somewhat higher level, but the 
difference is rather small. 
The level of elite and mass confidence in the church (Figure 3d) was ini-
tially high (75 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively) and remains rather stable 
over time. Elite confidence continues to exist on a somewhat higher level com-
pared to the general population, but with only minor differences. 
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Figure 3d: Confidence in the Church 
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Converging Attitudes? 
Some common tendencies are obvious. In all three countries during the whole 
period, elites have more confidence in the four institutions than the mass pub-
lic. Sometimes the elite-masses gap is wide, and at other times quite small and 
converging. The trend is occasionally going in different directions for the two 
groups. Despite such variations, the main pattern overall is clear: elites have 
more confidence than the mass public, especially in the new institutions of 
parliament and the free market. This gives support to the argument of democ-
ratic elitism: during the process of democratic consolidation, the elite constitute 
the major force for legitimating fundamental political, economic and social 
institutions. This conclusion is supported by the comparison of new and old 
institutions. The very hallmark of state transformation from authoritarian rule 
and central economic planning to democracy and market economy was a freely 
elected parliament and business companies operating in a competitive econ-
omy. Other institutions, like the police, largely represent a bridge between 
organizations and persons from the past regime and those of the new. This also 
can be applied to the church, which is rooted in common historical traditions 
that are often enshrined in religious practices. 
It is remarkable that in all three countries the gap in confidence between the 
elite and the masses is much wider for the new institutions representing democ-
racy and market economy while confidence in the old institutions (police and 
the church) shows much more congruence. From a liberal democratic perspec-
tive, the paradox is that institutions symbolizing the very core of regime-
change, namely, democracy and a market economy have their main supporters 
among the elites, while the mass public, which is from this perspective seen as 
the very fundament of democracy, lags behind and remains more critical. 
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Both the degree of convergence and the level of confidence vary considera-
bly between the three countries and over time. As for confidence in parliament, 
in Estonia the significant gap between confident elites and a critical population 
that is seen in the early period after transition is narrowing over time. In Latvia, 
however, the attitudes of elites and masses concerning confidence in parliament 
are quite similar in the beginning but differ significantly during the rest of the 
period. And in Lithuania, the substantial gap seen in the early period between 
mass and elite views persists, and the overall levels of confidence decline. 
Summing up the patterns for confidence in parliament, the Estonian elite and 
masses show that both groups are converging on a higher level. The Latvian 
pattern is divergence, with only elites reaching a higher level of confidence and 
the masses lagging behind. While in Lithuania a major difference in the start 
remains stable and is shifting to a lower level of confidence for both groups. 
Level of confidence in business companies is similar in Estonia and Latvia, 
and is growing for both elites and non-elites, so that by the end of the survey 
period there is the same high level in both countries. Lithuania is different, with 
the gap between an increasingly confident elite and a critical mass public wid-
ening over time. Confidence in the police in Estonia and Latvia is changing 
from initial low levels of trust to a more positive perception among the elites 
and the masses. We observe the same upward and congruent trend over time. 
The Lithuanian pattern is rather similar to Latvia, but with a dramatic drop in 
confidence in 1997. Regarding the church, in all three countries the level of 
confidence is high for both elites and non-elites. However, there is less confi-
dence in Estonia and Latvia than in Lithuania, especially among the mass public. 
Overall, the main result concerning elite-mass congruence is that, regarding 
the new institutions, the gap in level of confidence remains stable, although 
tending to increase over time. One exception to this trend is confidence associ-
ated with the Estonian parliament. Here elite-masses attitudes are converging, 
but primarily as a result of declining confidence among elites. 
Why do we find a deviant pattern of confidence in Lithuania in regards to 
the two new institutions? This difference may be explained by ethnic structure, 
political cleavages and elite recruitment. After change of regime in 1991, Esto-
nia and Latvia had a large percentage of Russians and Russian-speakers among 
their population, while in Lithuania the proportion was much lower. In Estonia 
and Latvia (with percentage of indigenous people of 62 per cent and 52 per 
cent, respectively, compared to Lithuania’s 80 per cent) nationalists saw their 
re-born nations as “swamped by” and vulnerable to Russian influence. The 
perceived threat from large Russian Diasporas with close ties to their homeland 
resulted in more renewed and integrated national elites than in Lithuania (Steen 
2000; 2006). Here a clearly politicized socio-economic cleavage, and much 
higher elite continuity from the past, led to political confrontations along the 
left-right axis from the beginning, resulting in more fragmented elite configura-
tions in Lithuania (Steen 1997b). In Estonia and Latvia, by contrast, ethnicity 
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became the main political cleavage. This resulted in a more integrated national 
elite characterized by more uniform attitudes, less antagonist behaviour, and 
more consensual orientations towards reform policies (Steen 1997a). As has 
been shown by Steen (2007), in Estonia the exceptionally rapid privatization of 
state property, economic “shock therapy”, the “race towards the market” and 
early aspiration to be a part of European structures was pushed forward by 
integrated elites. One explanation as to why, despite economic hardships for 
the masses, Estonia has been in the lead with regard to confidence in new insti-
tutions is a cultural identity based on ethnicity favourable to inter-elite trust and 
cohesion across social divisions. 
Conclusion: Confidence and Democratic Theory 
Liberal democratic theory takes account of the elite-dimension (Dahl 1971) but 
not as an independent force in the processes of democratic consolidation. This 
approach has a normative scent where the quality of democracy depends on the 
degree to which social interests are represented in the political process. Petter-
son (2010, 125) argues that some extent of elite-mass congruence is fundamen-
tal to legitimacy and therefore “is more likely to occur in the more advanced 
democracies”. In this study of 2006 that compared the pro-democratic orienta-
tions of members of parliaments and those of the mass public in five new and 
two old democracies, Petterson (2010) found that, in all countries, the parlia-
ment deputies and the masses score on the same level in pro-democratic orien-
tations, be it high or low. This indicates that the elites and the masses in each 
country relate to democratic norms in the same way, e.g. negative views of 
elites reflect negative views of population. Further, Petterson argues, this result 
is consistent with liberal democratic theory underscoring interdependence and 
similarity between elites and mass orientations. Congruent democratic orienta-
tions contradict the democratic elitist theory’s assumption of a successive proc-
ess where the values and orientations of independent liberal elites are formed 
early in the transition process and adopted later by the mass public, be it 
through socialization or manipulation. 
The findings presented here are based on a broader selection of elites and 
draw another picture of the elite-mass relationship, but only in respect of confi-
dence in the new institutions, that is, parliament and private business compa-
nies. The sizeable gap between elite and mass levels of confidence over more 
than a decade demonstrates that elites are not representing the masses more 
sceptical views. Elites’ views are independent, and as the figures illustrate, they 
change their views at a different pace to those of the masses, sometimes in a 
different direction, and not necessarily towards more confidence. Despite some 
variations among the three countries, the main finding is that the elites are 
clearly more confident in the institutions created after the change of regime. 
This supports an essential assumption in the theory of democratic elitism as 
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argued by Higley and Burton (2006), namely that the elites are not representing 
the more sceptical mass views, but are taking the lead in embracing the new 
democratic and economic institutions. Clearly, the elites are not expressing the 
same degree of disbelief in new institutions as the masses, but on the other 
hand the masses do not reject their leaders. In the Baltic States just after change 
of regime, mass trust in the leaders of political and economic institutions 
tended to be higher than the confidence in these institutions “as such” (Steen 
1996). Paradoxically, in the early consolidation period the masses were overtly 
critical of the new institutions but seemed to entrust leaders with the mandate 
to go forward and make the painful but necessary reform decisions.  
Although the trend-lines for confidence in parliament and business compa-
nies show that the elite and mass dimensions are separable and sequential, the 
patterns vary markedly between the countries. The top-down socialization, or 
may be manipulation, effect seems to be considerably stronger in Estonia and 
Latvia than in Lithuania. As demonstrated, confidence in the old institutions, 
namely the police and the church, shows another dynamic. The largely corre-
sponding attitudes indicate that the same stable expectations and experiences 
are common across social strata. And, surprisingly, if congruence of mass-elite 
confidence is a main characteristic of democratic legitimacy, as liberal democ-
ratic theory argues, old institutions continuing from the past are more legiti-
mate than new institutions. On the other hand, democratic elitist theory main-
tains that the very lack of congruent orientations shows that responsible elites 
are the vanguards of democratic and economic change, and resist mass pres-
sures to vacillate between reform and populism. 
I will conclude by saying that democratic elitism, emphasizing the role of el-
ites as political entrepreneurs, seems to provide a better explanation of degree 
of congruence and the persistent elite-mass gap in confidence in new core 
institutions related to regime change, than liberal democratic theory. Obvi-
ously, elites’ stronger support for new institutions following regime change is 
vital to political stability and economic reforms. However, specific historical 
circumstances, ethnic structures and political cleavages affect elite configura-
tions and mass orientations, and largely account for differences found between 
countries. Taking the level and direction of elite and masses confidence into 
consideration gives a fairly detailed picture of how elites are both the vanguard 
of democratic regime consolidation and rooted in national contexts that gener-
ate different opportunities and constraints for expressing confidence in institu-
tions. 
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Appendix 
Total Number of Elites Interviewed 
 1993/94 1997 2000 2003 2006/07 
Estonia 313 284* 281 271 264 
Latvia 300 300 285 280 280 
Lithuania 333 307 315 ** 316 
* Due to the small number of respondents from the Estonian parliament in the first survey that 
year, an additional round of interviews with the members of parliament was done later the 
same year. 
** No interviews were carried out in Lithuania in 2003. 
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